San Jose State University

SJSU ScholarWorks
Faculty Research, Scholarly, and Creative Activity
5-26-2022

Lessons learned from the World Health Organization’s late initial
response to the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
Chulwoo Park
San Jose State University, charles.park@sjsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/faculty_rsca
Part of the Health Services Administration Commons, and the International Public Health Commons

Recommended Citation
Chulwoo Park. "Lessons learned from the World Health Organization’s late initial response to the
2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa" Journal of Public Health in Africa (2022). https://doi.org/
10.4081/jphia.2022.1254

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Research, Scholarly, and Creative Activity by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.

Journal of Public Health in Africa 2022; volume 13:1254

N

on

-c

Introduction

The 2014-2016 Ebola Virus Disease
(EVD) epidemic in West Africa was one of
the largest, most devastating, and most
complex outbreaks in the history of infectious disease.1 According to the World
Health Organization (WHO), a total number
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The purpose of this article is to 1)
examine the role of the World Health
Organization (WHO) in controlling infectious disease outbreaks, 2) evaluate if the
WHO’s initial response to the 2014-2016
Ebola crisis was appropriate, 3) evaluate
current WHO’s efforts to prevent future disease outbreaks after the Ebola elimination,
and 4) suggest how WHO should be further
reformed to provide prompt and accurate
guidance to multi-sectoral health stakeholders at local, national, regional and global
level for effective surveillance preparedness
and response. This is a non-systematic narrative literature review. The articles from
PubMed, Scopus, Medline, books, WHO
documents and websites, and mass media
were collected to be analyzed. WHO is the
only specialized agency in the United
Nations (UN) that promotes people’s health
with legitimacy around the globe. Due to
the lack of funding and health workforce,
weak global health governance, and political and economic concerns about afflicted
countries, WHO failed to respond promptly
to the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West
Africa. WHO has a central role in the architecture of global health governance.
Although WHO was not the only one to be
responsible for devastating 2014-2016
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in
West Africa, it is undeniable that WHO was
unprepared to respond to the EVD and
failed to govern the global health response
system. Furthermore, WHO should always
remember its unique responsibility of taking the initiative to respond to the infectious
disease outbreak by alarming a distress call.
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of 28,616 confirmed, probable and suspected cases have been reported in Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa,
and 11,310 died in those cases.2 WHO identified the first case of the EVD through retrospective case-finding; a 2-year-old Emile
Ouamouno from the remote village of
Meliandou in Guinea fell ill with mysterious symptoms including black stool, fever,
and vomiting, and died two days later on 28
December 2013.3,4 The virus, which caused
the 2014-2016 West African Ebola outbreak, turned out to be the most lethal
among the family of five distinct Ebola
species, called the Zaire.3,5,6 Meliandou, the
ground zero of EVD, is a triangle-shaped
forested area where the borders of Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone converge, and
hunters and their families in that area are
presumed to have eaten Ebola-infected bush
meat.3 Through the notoriously porous borders, the earliest EVDs from Meliandou
cluster were rapidly spread to the whole
country and its neighboring countries –
Liberia in March 2014 and Sierra Leone in
June 2014 – affecting entire territories of
the three countries.3,5,7-9 Since all three
countries had no experience of EVD at all
and their health infrastructures were severely damaged due to past civil unrest,3 it was
not in their capacities to stop EVD.
Case fatality rates (CFRs) of EVD have
varied between 25% to 90% in the past outbreaks;5 the “naive CFRs” from 2014-2016
in West Africa were over/underestimated in
the middle of outbreak due to an incomplete
retrospective validation of cases and
deaths.10-13 When WHO realized the gravity
of the situation and declared the EVD outbreak in West Africa a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern
(PHEIC) on 8 August 2014, the outbreak
was already out of control, with 1,070 confirmed cases and 932 deaths.14 Various
mass media and scholars began claiming
that WHO intentionally delayed declaring
the Ebola emergency due to an ungrounded
fear of damaging the economies of the
afflicted countries.15-17 Most global health
actors – multilateral organizations, international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and philanthropic foundations –
failed to respond in the initial stages of the
EVD outbreak,18 and it caused them to take
more than two years to completely eliminate EVD from the onset of the first case. At
long last, WHO declared all three countries
free of the Ebola virus transmission as of 29
December 201519,20 and terminated the
PHEIC as of 29 March 2016.21 The “apparent CFR” of this Zaire EVD outbreak in
West Africa with definitive recorded laboratory-confirmed cases (15,227), accounting
for delays between the onset of Ebola
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symptoms and final outcome until 8 May
2016,10,20 is 74.3%.
WHO is the only global health institution from the United Nations (UN) that
rationalizes global health funding and activities with the legitimacy, but it faces a leadership crisis due to the advent of conflicted
powerful actors and multilateral organizations that are pursuing their vested
interests.22 This article investigates the following curiosities: 1) If WHO had not
ignored the screams for help from staffers
on the ground in Guinea in mid-April
2014,16 could a number of Ebola deaths
have been prevented? 2) As the agency that
has the unique authority to lead a global
response to a health crisis, why was WHO
content to adopt a “sit back and wait” attitude at the initial stage of Ebola outbreak?
3) Why does declaring a PHEIC matter
since WHO has no hard power to compulsorily collect financial aid and govern global
health actors? 4) What lessons has WHO
learned from the Ebola outbreak and how
has the organization been changed? 5) How
should WHO strengthen public health sur-

[Journal of Public Health in Africa 2022; 13:1254]

[page 43]

Article

al

us

e

on

ly

Although WHO headquarters in Geneva
was well informed of how serious the situation was, they worried that a PHEIC would
ramp up political and religious pressure and
give rise to catastrophic economic consequences for the afflicted countries.16,23 A
PHEIC includes imposing travel and trade
restrictions, so afflicted countries would
suffer from precipitous reductions in
tourism and trade. 23 In addition, Saudi
Arabia would not want to allow Muslims
from West Africa to visit Mecca for the
Islamic Hajj pilgrimage due to the fear of
the EVD.16,28,29 For these reasons, WHO
declined all requests by downplaying the
seriousness of the problem until 8 August
2014. WHO was quoted as saying, “This
outbreak isn’t different from previous outbreaks… It may be more effective to use
other diplomatic means for now.”16 WHO
was criticized for unnecessarily fueling
public fear from the PHEIC declaration for
2009’s H1N1 and 2014’s polio because
H1N1 was not that contagious and polio
was peripheral in a certain area.23 Because
of this, WHO did not want to exaggerate the
magnitude of the disease crisis and wanted
to wait for the absolute certitude of the situation in order to issue a PHEIC declaration.15 However, the WHO’s approach to
this crisis was against the basic pattern of
the epidemiologic curve, that the earlier
detection and faster responses reduce morbidity and mortality.23
According to the preamble of WHO
constitution, “Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which
can be fulfilled only by the provision of
adequate health and social measures.”30 In
the same vein, Margaret Chan said that “We
are not the first responder. You know, the
government has first priority to take care of
their people and provide health care.”31
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The study design was a non-systematic
narrative literature review. Articles written
in the English language during 2014-2016
were selected from PubMed, Scopus,
Medline, books, WHO documents and its
websites, and online mass media. For
PubMed, Medical Subject Heading [MeSH]
terms
were
used:
“Ebolavirus,”
“Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola,” “Ebola
Vaccines,” “Africa,” “Africa, Western,”
“Sierra Leone,” Guinea,” “Liberia,” “World
Health Organization,” “Government,”
“Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (U.S.),” “Organizations,”
“Health Policy,” “Policy Making,” “Public
Health,” “Public Health Surveillance,”
“Emergency Responders/organization and
administration,” “Infectious Disease
Incubation Period,” and “Infectious Disease
Medicine.” Title/Abstract [TiAb] or Text
Words [TW] were additionally used:
“response,” “preparedness,” “emergency”
and “governance.” Same keywords from
PubMed were used for Scopus and Medline.
Inclusion criteria were “the WHO’s performance during 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak
in West Africa,” “Governments and NGOs
efforts to contain the EVD,” “PHEIC,”
“International health regulation and funding,” and “Global health governance and
reform.” Exclusion criteria were all others
from the screening process, such as not
mentioned the global health actors’ reaction
to the EVD, PHEIC, regulation and funding, and global health governance and
reform. Among 486 records screened, 47
articles from core qualitative studies, books,
and newspapers were included.
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Materials and methods

to constitute a public health risk to other
States through the international spread of
disease and 2) to potentially require a coordinated international response.”25 In 2009,
WHO declared the first PHEIC in response
to the swine flu (H1N1) pandemic.22 The
communication flow for constituting
PHEIC is illustrated in Figure 1.22,26,27
In a globalized world, the government
has decreased the ability to control a deluge
of information, so WHO cannot entirely
rely on official state reports that are possibly antiquated.26 Since NGOs are doing
actual fieldwork on the ground, they face
urgent health crises much faster than the
government. To reflect this situation, Article
5 of IHR (2005) empowers WHO to consider unofficial sources from NGOs, mass
media, newspapers, independent scientists,
and any other non-state actors.22,23,25,26
Also, Article 12 of IHR (2005) clearly states
that WHO Director-General has the exclusive power to make a final decision regarding declaring a PHEIC.22,23,25 However,
Margaret Chan, the current WHO DirectorGeneral, postponed declaring PHEIC for
the Ebola outbreak for 5 months, from the
date that the Ebola virus began to spread
internationally. Only a few international
NGOs, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF),
Partners in Health, and Samaritan’s Purse,
promptly went to the frontline to fight the
EVD, and they continuously sounded the
alarm about the seriousness of the outbreak
through the media. Staffers in the field in
Guinea and an Ebola expert from WHO
Regional Office for Africa (WHO-AFRO)
sent a number of emails separately to the
WHO’s Geneva headquarters in mid-April
2014 saying “WE NEED SUPPORT.”16,17
MSF urged WHO to deploy a massive supply of resources in June 2014, claiming that
“the epidemic is out of control.”
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veillance with rapid detection, assessment,
and response in order to better fight a disease outbreak in the future?

Results

Public health emergencies of international concerns

After experiencing two frightening outbreaks – Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) and highly pathogenic
Influenza A (H5N1) – political leaders at
last realized the urgent necessity to revise
the International Health Regulations (IHR)
that has not been updated since 1969.22,23
The 58th World Health Assembly (WHA) –
the supreme governing bodies for the
WHO24 – adopted the second edition of
IHR on 21 May 2005, including PHEIC “an
extraordinary event which is determined, 1)
[page 44]

Figure 1. The communication flow for constituting PHEIC.
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It is true that WHO has very limited
funding to take action against a disease outbreak with its own capacity. It is also apparent that individual member states remained
unmotivated to contribute EBFs to WHO.
However, the WHO’s failure to initiate
response to the EVD was not about a lack of
funding, but a lack of will. WHO is not an
international financial institution that provides grants or loans to afflicted countries,
which is what the World Bank, Global
Fund, Gates Foundation, and other philanthropic foundations do. WHO has six major
roles to direct and coordinate authority on
international health; 1) providing leadership, 2) shaping the research agenda, 3) setting norms and standards, 4) articulating
ethical and evidence-based policy options,
5) providing technical support, and 6) monitoring and assessing health situation.46
WHO did not fill any of these roles during
the early stages of the EVD outbreak. Even
if WHO does not have enough resources to
deploy its own staff to the field, the organization should provide accurate, prompt, and
impartial data and information concerning
global health threats in order to gather all
potential capacities from the multi-sectoral
global health communities. The reason why
WHO was severely criticized for its
response to the EVD outbreak was that the
public did not see the organization’s willingness to put energy into developing and
implementing a disease response program
to contain the EVD. It is the WHO’s fundamental role to lead and guide all stakeholders in how to react to unprecedented disease
outbreaks; that is why the organization
exists. Though governments are responsible
for initially responding to diseases to protect their citizenry, WHO still needs to take
the initiative to gather all global power to
contain diseases if it is judged that the government has no health system to control the
disease.
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To keep global health governance operational, WHO needs to receive financial
support from member states and non-state
actors.26,43,44 WHO receives two types of
funds annually: 1) regular budgetary funds
(RBFs), called assessed contributions, and
2) extra-budgetary funds (EBFs), called
voluntary contributions.26,43,44 While it is
required for each member state to contribute to RBFs aligned with the size of its
economy, WHO has no control over EBFs
because member states or other private
actors decide entirely on their own how
much they will allocate to EBFs.26,43,44 Due
to member states’ resistance to increasing
RBFs, these funds have had no nominal
growth in recent years.26,43-45 WHO has
mainly relied on unpredictable EBFs, and
these funds are 77% of the organization’s
total funding.26,43-45 In addition, there has
recently been a budget cut for WHO’s emergency category; funding for outbreak and
crisis response was cut 51.4% (from $469
million to $228 million) for the 2014-2015
budget cycle, while funding for noncommunicable diseases increased 20.5% (from
$264 million to $318 million). WHO
attempted to reform its health system when
the world experienced the 2009 swine flu
pandemic,22 but its budgetary limitations
were the biggest obstacle preventing the
organization from becoming more responsive to global health threats.26 To meet the
economic demands for response to the
infectious disease, the 2009 IHR review
committee proposed several solutions: 1)
establish a global health emergency workforce, 2) create a $100 million contingency
fund for emergencies (CFE) for use during
a PHEIC, and 3) modernize strategies for
IHR capacity building implementation.22
However, political will for the implementation of this proposal was challenging due to
the global economic recession,26 and WHO
failed to raise a CFE and had no capacity or
practical support to contain the EVD.

Who should be a champion for global health threats?

ly

Academy.39,40 France, China, Cuba,
Germany, South Korea, and many other
member states also provided humanitarian
aid by building Ebola clinics, or sending
lab/ disaster relief teams, health workers or
motorbikes for the EVD response.16,41,42
The EVD was finally contained thanks to
consistent hard work and efforts from intergovernmental organizations, member states,
NGOs, and private sectors. The consequence of the late response to the EVD was
brutal, however; the death toll reached
11,310 in three West African countries,
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.2

om

Keiji Fukuda, WHO Assistant DirectorGeneral for Health Security, concurred with
her that “WHO did not have enough health
workers, doctors, nurses, drivers, and contact tracers to manage the high numbers of
Ebola cases.”31 However, these three West
African countries had almost no resources,
including a lack of health facilities, health
workforce, and knowledge about the disease, to contain the EVD and needed
absolute humanitarian assistance.
WHO monitors 800 disease outbreaks
worldwide every year, but its staff size of
7,000 employees is 50% less than that of the
Centers for Disease Prevention and Control
(CDC).32,33 Margaret Chan made a speech
at the 68th WHA that “WHO was overwhelmed, as were all other responders,”
regarding public criticisms of WHO’s late
initial response to EVD outbreak.34 Also,
Bruce Aylward, the WHO’s top Ebola official, adhered to the conservative thought
that labeling the EVD outbreak a PHEID
would not have been a magic bullet;16 in
that case, then, does a PHEIC even matter?
There are in fact a few reasons supporting
the importance of a PHEIC because it can
deliver a prestigious, authoritative message
that everyone pays close attention to. A
PHEID does not involve dispatching a
workforce from WHO on the ground but is
about functioning as a global distress call. A
PHEIC declaration should come with temporary, non-binding recommendations
about health measures that member states
are required to follow.35 Thus, it would be
able to press all global health stakeholders
to focus on true crises among the 800 disease outbreaks each year and convey what
resources are needed to respond to a particular disease. Likewise, Joanne Liu, MSF’s
international president said that “[PHEIC]
is important because it gives a clear signal
that nobody can ignore the epidemic anymore.”16
When WHO was on the verge of declaring a PHEIC for the EVD, the World Bank
Group heard about WHO’s exigent circumstances and pledged $200 million in emergency funding to help contain the outbreak
in West Africa.36 After a PHEIC was
declared, several member states reacted
quickly to the EVD. U.S. President Barack
Obama made a pledge to deploy 3,000
troops to Liberia on 16 September 2014;37
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
spent a total cost of $402.8 million to train
1,539 local health care workers, build 10
Ebola treatment units, and contribute to
Ebola research.38 The United Kingdom
decided to send 750 troops and a hospital
ship to West Africa to establish an Ebola
Treatment Center and Ebola Training

Current WHO’s efforts for disease
response

Member states began investing in CFE
to enable WHO to respond to the global
health threats with its own capacity.
Although WHO needs $66.22 million more
to fill the funding gap, a total of $18.16 million was allocated to a number of WHO
responses to disease outbreaks and natural
disasters, such as the Hurricane Matthew in
Haiti, the cholera outbreak in Yemen and
DRC, the yellow fever outbreak in Angola,
DRC, and Uganda, and the Zika virus in the
Americas.47 In early 2015, an outbreak of
the Zika virus was identified in northeast
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WHO is long overdue for reforms that
will allow the organization to respond to
health emergencies more effectively. WHO
should consider the following reforms:
i. The WHO’s next Director-General
should not only have a working knowledge concerning the purpose and role of
WHO but also possess a strong,
assertive, decisive, and time-bound
leadership.52 Good governance and
leadership within WHO would be from
a Director General.
ii. WHO needs to lead the global health
system governance by convening governments and other major stakeholders
and developing a global strategy of
investing national core capacities.35,52
Each government should agree to a regular assessment of its core capacities,
provide adequate support to countries
that suffer from diseases,52 and contribute to EBF and CFE.
iii. It is necessary to review and define the
WHO’s core functions again to make
sure everyone understands the scope of
the function that WHO is required to do.
WHO itself was confused concerning
what to do during the EVD outbreak in
West Africa due to the lack of understanding about the organization's constitution, mandate, legitimacy, and authority.
iv. WHO needs to encourage NGOs and
non-state actors to join in the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development
and be willing to cooperate with

Discussion and conclusions

ci

Heading for the future: essential
reforms

them.53,54
v. The Director-General’s exclusive
responsibility for a PHEIC should be
broadened to a vote held by all member
states.52 Making a final decision of a
PHEIC from one person at the internal
Emergency Committee meeting is not a
democratic and transparent way, so all
member states should exercise their
rights to make an opinion by casting its
vote.
vi. Sovereignty, accountability, and responsibility should be clearly designated to
respond to the disease without any confusion.55
vii. The governments, and NGOs should be
the front line of working on the ground,
but when their capacity is limited to
control an outbreak, WHO should provide international support immediately
by guiding all global health actors with
clear direction.
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Brazil, and more than 3,000 suspected
microcephaly cases were reported in Brazil
during the second half of 2015 alone, which
is 40 times higher than usual.48 The Zika
virus has spread to almost every country in
the Americas. On 1 February 2016, WHO
declared a PHEIC in response to the Zika
virus.49 Although it remains to be seen
whether WHO used its authority and legitimacy to label Zika a PHEIC based on objective communication flow or as an evasion
of more criticism from the media, it was a
prompt action to attract great attention from
all global health actors. In addition, WHO
provided authoritative public health advice
regarding the 2016 Summer Olympics, stating that canceling or changing the 2016
Olympics location from Brazil would not
significantly alter the spread of the Zika
virus internationally.50 Thanks to the
WHO’s insight, the Rio Olympics was successfully held as planned with no Zika cases
reported.51 As seen in this case, one of the
WHO’s functions is to minimize disruption
by offering advice.
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